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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
attachment". Possibly, with the convenience and practi-
cality of garnishment, this question need not come up in
Maryland, but if it does, it would seem to be necessary
to decide if under the provisions of Article 9 rather than of
the above section of Article 11.
RIGHT OF REMOVAL WHERE
THIRD PARTY IMPLEADED
Elliott v. Larrimore'
The Plaintiff, Mildred Larrimore, was injured when
the automobile, in which she was a passenger, ran off the
road and struck a pole of one of the Appellees, the Con-
solidated Gas, Electric Light and Power Company of Balti-
more (hereinafter referred to as "Gas Company"). The
vehicle was owned by the Defendant-Appellant, Harry
Elliott, and at the time of the accident was being driven by
his wife, Norma Elliott, the other Defendant-Appellant.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, alleging negligence on the part of Defendant-Ap-
pellants Elliotts. The Elliotts, with leave of Court, filed
a third-party complaint 2 against the Gas Company, alleg-
ing that the negligence of the company in erecting an un-
lighted pole so that it jutted, in part, onto the highway,
contributed to the happening of the accident. Thereafter
the Elliotts, without notice to the Gas Company, filed a
suggestion for removal pursuant to the constitutional3 pro-
vision. An order was passed removing the case. On the
day following this order, the Gas Company4 filed a motion
seeking a rescission thereof. After a hearing on the motion,
'203 Md. 526, 101 A. 2d 817 (1954).
Under Rule 4, General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part Two,
subd. III.
'Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 8, which provides, in part:
"... upon suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties
to said proceedings, that such party cannot have a fair and Impartial
trial in the Court in which the same may be pending, the said Court
shall order . . . (,the case) . . . to be transmitted to some other
Court ......
4Note that General Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra, n. 2, by
Rule 7, superseded Md. Code (1951), Art. 26, Sec. 50, which was the statu-
tory predecessor of Rule 4, under which the Gas Company was brought In.
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an order was entered rescinding the prior order. The lower
court in denying the Elliotts' request for removal held that
even though the Constitution of Maryland guarantees to
litigants in civil cases an absolute right of removal, the
application for such removal must be joined in, as required
by the case law of Maryland,5 by all the defendants which
includes the impleaded party, the Gas Company. The
Elliotts appealed this last order, contending that since the
Plaintiff did not amend her declaration so as to declare
against the Gas Company, no relation of plaintiff and de-
fendant existed between them and that therefore the Gas
Company was not in the status of a co-defendant for the
purposes of removal. The Gas Company defended the lower
court's ruling on the ground that by being joined in the
action as a third-party under the Third-Party Practice rule,'
it had the status of a defendant and therefore consent to
removal by all parties defendant was essential before the
Constitutional right could be exercised.
In affirming the ruling of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals, speaking through Judge Hammond, pointed out
that a party defendant to an action may, under our Third-
Party Practice procedure, within the discretion of the trial
court, implead as a third party a person who is or may be
liable for all or part of the claim of the plaintiff. Judge Ham-
mond went on to point out that Rule 4,7 under which the
Gas Company was impleaded, did not specify the status of
such a party, but that compelling logic would classify him
as a defendant. In Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rosoff,
decided under the Third-Party Practice rule, Judge Mar-
bury said:
"Where a third party is impleaded, he is in no worse
situation than if he had been originally sued. Nothing
final has been decided against him. He still has the
opportunity to try his case, and if it goes against him,
he can then appeal. No rights of the original plaintiff
have been interfered with, because the result is only
that he has another defendant in the case, against
whom he may recover."
State v. Gore, 32 Md. 498 (1870).
8Supra, n. 2.
Supra, n. 2. But under Md. Code (1951), Art. 50, Sec. 26 (a), superseded
by Rule 7, supra, n. 4, the impleaded party was specified as a "third-party
defendant".
8 195 Md. 421, 433, 73 A. 2d 461 (1950). In this case, plaintiff did not
amend to declare against the third parties.
1955]
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Judge Hammond also cited an earlier case9 decided un-
der the Joint Tortfeasors statute." Both cases indicated,
without deciding, that a party joined under procedural
rules would be treated as a party plaintiff or defendant for
all purposes. Judge Hammond concluded, therefore, that
the third-party Gas Company must be considered as a de-
fendant and that their consent was necessary in a sugges-
tion for removal by defendant Elliotts.
Aside from the basic question raised in the case, the
Court raised, without answering, the problem of the right
of a third party to remove where a separate trial is ordered
under Rule 5 of the General Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, Part Two, subd. III. Another question could arise
where the defendant moves for a change of venue and then
impleads the third party. Will the impleaded third party
be precluded from obtaining a change of venue because
one defendant has already exercised the limited right of
removal?
The Maryland Constitution" gives the authority for re-
moval. The Legislature has the constitutional power to en-
large, but not restrain, this right.2 The Court of Appeals
early stated that it will liberally construe this privilege,"
but later cases seem to indicate that, in the absence of clear
legislative directive, a somewhat narrow interpretation is
applied to the words "party" and "parties". In State v.'
Gore, ' 4 the Court stated that where there is more than one
person as plaintiff or as defendant, the term "party" must
be interpreted in a "collective and representative sense".
In that case the Court indicated that any other interpreta-
tion could lead to a defeat of the judicial processes. If the
number of defendants, for example, were great enough,
9 Brotman v. McNamara, 181 Md. 224, dis. op. 229, 231, 29 A. 2d 264,
di8. op. 267 (1942), where Judge Marbury, in a dissenting opinion said:
"There does not seem to be any doubt that under the joint tort-
feasors law the Intention Is to have the jury pass upon the liabilities of
all parties in one case. If the plaintiff does not put them all in, the
defendant can do so, and in such case the same result will be reached
as if the added parties had originally been made defendants. The fact
that plaintiff did not then amend his declaration cannot prejudice the
rights of the defendants to have the others in."
See also Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 46 A. 2d 349 (1946).
"0Md. Code (1951), Art. 50, Sees. 20-29. See. 26 (superseded by Rule 7,
8upra, n. 4), provided that the third party could be offered as a person
liable to the defendant or to the original plaintiff, and that plaintiff "shall
amend" to assert -any claims he may have against the third party.
uSupra, n. 3.
'2Wright v. Hamner, 5 Md. 370, 375 (1854).
"State v. Dashiell, 6 H. & J. 268 (Md., 1824) ; Cromwell v. The State,
12 G. & J. 257 (1841) ; Negro Jerry v. Townshend, 2 Md. 274 (1852) ; Price
v. The State, 8 Gill 295 (1849) ; Griffin v. Leslie, 20 Md. 15 (1863).
1 Supra, n. 5.
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successive exercises of a right of removal could exhaust
the judicial circuits within the State.
The doctrine of the Gore case has subsequently been
cited and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in several
cases.15 It seems clear that where there are two or more
persons to a side, all must concur in suggesting removal,
or, at least, offer no dispute to the desire of one of their
number.16
The early interpretation of the Constitutional provision
was made on a common law basis and prior to the adoption
of our third-party practice. Under common law rules the
right of removal was not absolute but depended largely on
the ability of the party to convince the judge of the inability
of obtaining a fair trial in the particular county. As an
exercise of quasi-equitable jurisdiction, the judge could
order the case removed to an alternate county.
With the adoption of the third-party practice in 1941 a
new element was introduced. A party defendant, for ex-
ample, could, at the discretion of the court, implead a third
party on the contention that he is not a party to the case
but "is or may be liable to (defendant) for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim . . ." Rule 4 of the General Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Part Two, subd. III, states that
plaintiff "may assert ... any claim" against the impleaded
third party. This provision leaves the option to the plain-
tiff. Under Sec. 26(a) of Article 50 of the Code of 1951,1"
it was stated that plaintiff "shall" amend against the new
party.18 Under either provision, however, it is indicated
that a decision in the case will normally be res judicata as
to all liabilities between all parties.
The impleaded third party, in a technical sense, is not a
party to the action as contemplated by the framers of our
Constitution. At that time it was customary for plaintiff
to include such defendants as he desired in testing liability
on the cause of action. Under the new practice, a some-
what different situation comes into being, since plaintiff,
as in the Elliott case, may elect not to amend as to the new
1"Cooke v. Cooke, 41 Md. 362, 368 (1875) ; Baltimore County v. United
Rys. Co., 99 Md. 82, 83, 57 A. 675 (1904) ; Taxicab Co. of Balto. v. Emanuel,
125 Md. 246, 265, 93 A. 807 (1915).
16 In Diamond State of Balto. Co. v. Blake, 105 Md. 570, 66 A. 631 (1907),
it was held that a foreign corporation seeking to remove to a United States
Court was precluded from such removal where the co-defendant, a domestic
corporation, objected.
1" The procedure outlined in this section has been replaced by Rule 4, and
superseded by Rule 7, supra, ns. 4, 10.
"Held not mandatory by Judge MeLanahan In Shaut v. Baltimore Transit
Co., Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, October 8, 1942.
1955)
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party. For the purposes of trial, however, it seems undis-
putable that all persons involved, whether by direct suit
or through impleading, are concerned with the legal im-
plications of the alleged wrong in the case. It may be true
that plaintiff has no particular interest regarding the third
party, but certainly the third party himself has an interest
in the decision inasmuch as the result will settle his lia-
bility, if any, in the action.
Tracing the logic and reasoning of the Maryland de-
cisions, it seems to be an inescapable conclusion that, in the
absence of further legislative expansion of the privilege,
the Court of Appeals interprets our Constitutional pro-
vision on removal as limiting the right to one per side,
regardless of the number of parties per side, their technical
positions as litigants in the case, or the manner in which
they were brought in. Hence, if the trial court orders two
or more cases consolidated for trial, it would appear that
the doctrine in the instant case would be applied as to sug-
gestions for removal.
The Elliott case has settled that an impleaded third
party defendant must consent to a request for removal by
the original defendant. Under the power of the courts
today to order a separate trial it would seem that in such a
case concurrence of both defendants in requesting removal
would not be necessary. The trials being separate, the
parties should be able to act independently. Rule 519 states
that the court "... to avoid prejudice.. ." or for convenience
may order separate trials. As Judge Hammond pointed
out in the Elliott case, the trial courts have ". . . very wide
discretion and power of regulation of the proceedings .".20
In the present case, for example, if plaintiff had amended
against the third-party Gas Company, a severance could
have been ordered by the trial judge, and in such an event
the generally liberal (where practical) interpretation of
the removal right by the Court of Appeals, would appear
to support the view that the defendant Elliotts could, after
the severance, remove their case, and that the impleaded
third-party defendant Gas Company could elect, as sole
defendant in their case, to have their trial in the county
where sued. Or, as would seem more likely under that
situation, the Elliotts could defend alone, exercise their
right of removal unfettered, and go against the Gas Com-
"General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part Two, subd. III, Rule
5(a).
-203 Md. 526, 533, 101 A. 2d 817 (1954).
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pany in a suit for contribution.2' Since, however, the possi-
bility of separate trials is present, it would appear sound
to treat each trial, and rights of removal in each, separately
and independently. Certainly by such an interpretation
and by the prudent exercise of his discretion, the trial judge
could protect the interests of all parties concerned as fully
as possible under the law.
The question of removal after a defendant has once
removed and then impleads a third party (assuming venue
requirements can be satisfied), seems to present greater
obstacles. In such a case the right has already been exer-
cised according to present interpretations of "party" and
"parties" and yet, the third party has been denied voice in
the motion. Under the Maryland decisions on the question
of removal it would seem that the third party would be
barred from further removal despite the apparent preju-
dice.22 The Court of Appeals has too consistently adhered
to the theories of "one right only" and "consent of all on a
side" to open such a loophole in the administration ofjustice. The same fears expressed in State v. Gore" could
become realities under a contrary ruling. The discretion of
the trial judge in permitting the impleading of a third party
after one removal, or in authorizing separate trials, would
appear an adequate protection from injustice. Or, indeed,
as indicated by the Court of Appeals and within the Con-
stitutional provision itself, the Legislature may act to en-
large the privilege of removal in cases where it feels in-
justice would be done as a result of the third-party rules,
which have undoubtedly magnified the scope of the original
Constitutional provision on change of venue.
2 Cong. Country Club v. B. & 0. R. Co., 194 Md. 533, 71 A. 2d 696 (1950);
O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co., 201 Md. 345, 94 A. 2d 26 (1953), noted
in 14 Md. L. Rev. 97 (1954).
21 In addition to cases cited earlier, see State v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 69 Md.
339, 14 A. 685 (1888) ; Chappell Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 85 Md. 684, 36 A.
712 (1897).
-32 Md. 498 (1870).
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